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BEYOND PRODUCT MARKETS: NEW INSIGHTS ON LIABILITY OF 
FOREIGNNESS FROM CAPITAL MARKETS 
 
Abstract 
 
We expand the Liability of Foreignness (LOF) construct beyond the product market domain to 
include liabilities faced by firms attempting to secure resources in host capital markets. Drawing 
from institutional theory and research in finance, we identify institutional distance, information 
asymmetry, unfamiliarity, and cultural differences as the main sources of capital market LOF 
(CMLOF). We then propose that the impact of these antecedent factors can be moderated 
through bonding, signaling, organizational isomorphism, and reputational endorsements. 
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BEYOND PRODUCT MARKETS: NEW INSIGHTS ON LIABILITY OF 
FOREIGNNESS FROM CAPITAL MARKETS 
  
 The accelerating pace of global capital market integration in the last two decades has had 
a profound impact on the strategies of firms accessing capital resources. Today, with the 
lowering of institutional barriers, cross-border capital flows occur in a variety of ways such as 
foreign portfolio investment, foreign direct investment, cross-border acquisitions, cross-listings, 
and initial public offerings in foreign stock exchanges.  However, despite the initial euphoria 
about increased access to global capital markets, foreign firms tend to be at a disadvantage 
compared to domestic firms as they are likely to experience higher cost of capital, lower 
liquidity, and less analyst coverage (Blass & Yafeh, 2001; Ding, Nowak & Zhang, 2010).  
Further, a number of foreign firms have been found to withdraw shortly after entering host 
capital markets (see Karolyi, 2009, for a review).  Extant literature provides only limited 
theoretical understanding about the underlying factors that cause foreign firms to experience 
higher costs in host capital markets. This, in turn, has resulted in an inability to identify potential 
remedies foreign firms can deploy to mitigate these costs. 
 To date a significant body of theoretical and empirical research has accumulated 
evaluating the sources of liabilities of foreignness (LOF) that foreign firms face in host countries, 
compared to domestic firms (Caves, 1971; Hymer, 1976).  LOF is considered as the 
“fundamental assumption driving theories of the multinational enterprise” (Zaheer, 1995: 341) 
and is often treated as a “taken-for-granted assumption” (Zaheer, 2002) in the international 
management literature.  Researchers evaluating LOF have tried to answer two fundamental 
questions.  First, what are the sources of these additional costs that a foreign firm would incur 
that a local firm would not incur?  Second, what can firms do to overcome the costs associated 
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with LOF?  However, much of the growing body of research on LOF that has focused on 
answering these fundamental questions is almost exclusively related to firms expanding their 
products, services, and operations to other countries as part of their global expansion.  
Consequently, our collective understanding of LOF are usually associated with the local lack of 
knowledge of the foreign firm’s products and brand, cultural differences in management 
practices, etc. that ultimately lead to foreign firms competing at a disadvantage and 
underperforming  against local competitors in host markets. This conceptualization may have 
been adequate in an era when ‘internationalization’ was understood almost exclusively as 
globalization of product markets. However, the increasing integration of capital markets adds a 
new dimension to internationalization where a firm, in addition to selling its product and services 
to foreign customers, may attempt to sell its securities to foreign investors. Further, there is 
increasing recognition among international business scholars that investors in both developed 
and developing markets strongly prefer to invest in domestic firms rather than foreign firms in 
capital markets (Ke, Ng, & Wang, 2010). Hence, the objective of this paper is to expand the 
domain of the liabilities of foreignness construct to include liabilities faced by firms accessing 
host country capital markets1. Throughout the rest of this paper, we refer to these liabilities as 
capital market liabilities of foreignness, or CMLOF. Further, we also identify the strategies 
managers can employ to overcome CMLOF.    
 Navigating the dynamic international capital market environment and attracting capital 
market participants located in dissimilar cultural and institutional environments is a difficult 
challenge facing the international manager. Just as managers must contend with liabilities of 
foreignness in product markets, they must also be aware of the sources CMLOF and be prepared 
                                                          
1 The majority of our discussion is restricted to equity markets since a rapid integration of equity markets was the 
most pronounced globalization phenomenon over the past decade. 
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to strategically mitigate the resulting costs. If liabilities of foreignness are prevalent in the capital 
markets, it has implications for a firm’s cost of capital and firm value (Stulz, 1999). In addition 
to addressing CMLOF costs and strategies to mitigate their effects, investigating the 
internationalization of firms through capital markets can help to answer why firms engage in 
foreign expansion despite the prevalence of these costs that put them at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to local firms. The need for studying the internationalization of capital 
markets was eloquently made recently by Birkinshaw et al. (2006: 697)  
".....it is interesting to speculate on the idea that MNCs can internationalize 
with regard to the capital markets, to parallel the classic line of thinking 
about internationalization vis-`a-vis the product markets (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977).  MNCs have a range of ways in which they can increase 
their visibility and relationships with major shareholders and financial 
institutions, from depositary receipts through a full overseas listing to a 
relocation of the corporate HQ to a global financial center. While different 
in many ways, these approaches can be viewed as a series of steps, each 
involving a higher investment and a greater level of commitment to the 
global capital markets, but offering important rewards in terms of the costs 
of borrowing, the liquidity of the stock, and the effectiveness of the MNC’s 
corporate governance." 
 
 In order to extend the domain of the LOF construct to capital markets, we start by 
reviewing the extant literature on the different sources of such liabilities in product markets and 
assess the cumulative empirical evidence on strategies pursued by firms to overcome LOF.  We 
then develop a model that includes the costs facing firms in host country capital markets and the 
willingness of host market investors to devote resources in outside firms.  We explain how 
CMLOF costs may be driven by institutional differences between home and host markets. 
Similarly, information flows are an important determinant of cross-border equity transactions 
(Portes & Rey, 2005).   Additionally, it is quite plausible that cultural differences between 
countries will influence a wide range of capital market transactions (Guiso, Sapienza, & 
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Zingales, 2006, 2008, 2009) and ultimately impact the performance of foreign firms in host 
markets relative to local competitors.  We then suggest a variety of strategies that firms can 
pursue to moderate CMLOF and gain legitimacy in host country capital markets. These include 
bonding and signaling activities, organizational isomorphism, and endorsements by third parties.   
Finally, we offer a research agenda for the future investigation of CMLOF and conclude by 
discussing the implications for further research and theory development.  
LIABILITY OF FOREIGNNESS: SOURCES AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES  
 The origins of the concept of LOF can be traced back to the works of Hymer (1976) and 
Kindleberger (1969) who laid out the theoretical reasons why foreign firms are likely to incur 
additional costs that local firms would not incur and face competitive disadvantages.  Hymer 
(1976) argued that foreign subsidiaries experience a competitive disadvantage due to fact that 
local firms have better information about the local competitive environment, including the 
economy, language, social needs and preferences, law, and politics.  It has been argued that firms 
with an “operation in a foreign country will usually entail higher costs, everything else being 
equal, than operation at home” (Hennart, 1982: 2). The study of the systematic liabilities 
encountered by populations of firms due to factors that are by and large out of their control has 
parallels in population ecology research where considerable attention has been paid to the twin 
concepts of liabilities of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) and liabilities of smallness (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977). Given the conceptual similarities between LOF and these other types of 
liabilities, Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997: 440) suggest that “liability of foreignness might need 
to stand alongside the other liabilities of age and size.” 
The most widely used definition of LOF in the literature is provided by Zaheer (1995: 
343) who considers LOF as “all additional costs a firm operating in  a market overseas incurs 
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that a local firm would not incur.”  The focus of LOF is on the subtle structural/relational and 
institutional costs, or the “social costs of access and acceptance” (Zaheer, 2002: 352). 
Structural/relational costs arise from a foreign firm’s network position in the host country and its 
linkages to important local actors.   Most likely, a local firm would incur less of these costs 
because it has better developed local networks.  Institutional costs arise from institutional 
distance between the home and host countries, and higher the institutional distance the lower the 
legitimacy of the foreign firm.  Eden and Miller (2004) explain that these social costs arise from 
unfamiliarity, relational, and discriminatory hazards with institutional distance as the key driver 
behind each of these costs.  Unfamiliarity costs result from a firm’s lack of knowledge of or 
experience in the host country.  Discrimination hazards arise from discriminatory treatment by 
the host government in a variety of ways ranging from discriminatory taxation to discriminatory 
procurement.  It can also arise from discriminatory treatment by customers in the host country 
who may prefer a local product out of nationalistic reasons or dislike products from a foreign 
country for historical reasons (ex. Japanese cars in Korea).  To a great extent, the discrimination 
hazards arise from the “legitimacy deficit” (Schmidt & Sofka, 2009) faced by a firm in a foreign 
country.  Relational hazards relate to the higher costs that a foreign firm would incur both with 
respect to internal organization and external market transactions.  
In Table 1 we provide a summary of empirical research on LOF. While LOF has been the 
underlying theoretical motivation for a wide range of studies, we limit our review to those 
studies that make a direct comparison between foreign and local competitors.  For instance,  
Zaheer (1995) found that there are systematic differences in the profitability of foreign trading 
rooms compared to local trading rooms in the same location, and attributed the lower 
profitability of foreign trading rooms to LOF.  Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) found that foreign 
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trading rooms have a lower chance of survival compared to local trading rooms providing 
additional empirical demonstration of the existence of LOF.  Similarly, it has been found that 
foreign-owned banks in the United States were less efficient than U.S. owned banks (DeYoung 
& Nolle, 1996). Likewise, Japanese-owned banks in the U.S. market have been shown to be less 
profitable than their U.S. counterparts (Hasan & Hunter, 1996).  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 The empirical results in Table 1 imply that, at least among firms competing in the product 
market domain, foreign-owned firms are expected to have lower profitability and a lower 
survival rate than domestic firms, ceteris paribus (see, e.g., Lord & Ranft, 2000; Zaheer, 1995; 
Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997).  The cumulative evidence suggests that LOF is prevalent across a 
wide range of industries such as banking, automobiles, and currency trading (DeYoung & Nolle, 
1996; Mezias, 2002; Miller & Parkhe, 2002; Miller & Richards, 2002; Sofka & Zimmermann, 
2008) and that it has a negative impact on firm performance (DeYoung & Nolle, 1996; Hasan & 
Hunter, 1996; Miller & Parkhe, 2002; Sofka & Zimmermann, 2005; Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer & 
Mosakowski, 1997).  
Sources of Liabilities of Foreignness 
Based on a review of prior literature, Zaheer (1995) identified at least four sources of 
costs that put a foreign firm at a competitive disadvantage with local firms.  First, these are 
spatial costs, which relate to costs arising from transportation and coordination.  Even in a world 
where technology has shrunk distance and time, these costs are non-trivial (Ghemawat, 2001).  
Second, there are costs that arise because of a firm’s unfamiliarity with the local environment.  
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As Caves (1971: 5) points out, “the foreign firm must pay dearly for what the native has acquired 
at no cost to the firm…..or can acquire more cheaply” as a result  of its knowledge of the host 
country.  Third, there are costs resulting from the host country environment due to the lack of 
legitimacy of the foreign firm as well as the prevalence of economic nationalism in many 
countries.  The boycott of French products in the US in the aftermath of the Iraq war or the 
Japanese government making only Japanese cars eligible for its equivalent of the “cash for 
clunkers” program are recent examples of economic nationalism impacting consumer behavior.  
In addition, local consumers may be not familiar with the foreign firm’s brand and products, and 
they would lean towards buying more familiar local brands even when their quality and prices do 
not match foreign entrants. Finally, there are costs arising out of the home country environment 
as well. These may take the form of restrictions on high technology exports, embargos on trade 
and investment against specific countries etc. 
Strategies to overcome Liabilities of Foreignness 
 Considerable recent empirical research has concentrated on the question of what firms 
can do to overcome LOF.  Zaheer (1995) suggested local isomorphism as a possible response.  
This approach requires the firm to mimic the administrative practices of local firms.  In a similar 
vein, Mezias (2002) found that foreign firms who used American top officers or whose parent 
firms had more U.S. operations faced fewer labor lawsuit judgments.  Eden and Miller (2004), 
Haiyang, Griffith, and Ru (2006) and Chen (2006) suggest that the negative effects of LOF can 
be reduced by appropriate entry mode choice.  Luo, Shenkar and Nyaw (2002) report that foreign 
firms entering China reduced their LOF by a combination of offensive (networking, legitimacy 
improvement) and defensive (contracts, output standardization) strategies. Both Eden and Molot 
(2002) and Nachum (2003) suggest that the key to overcoming LOF is to use firm specific 
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resources to outperform local rivals based on studies of auto and financial service industries 
respectively.  Elango (2009) found that foreign insurance companies in the US coped with LOF 
by greater boundary spanning and adoption of differing strategic postures.  Zaheer (2002) argues 
that LOF is an inherently dynamic concept.  That is, LOF can change with the passage of time.  
Over time, as a firm becomes an insider in a country, LOF might decline or disappear.  
Hindustan Lever (the Indian subsidiary of Unilever) and ITC (the Indian subsidiary of Imperial 
Tobacco Company) may be two examples of foreign firms that as a result of their long history 
and specific strategies have attained insider status in their home country.  Kostova and Zaheer 
(1999) and Insch and Miller (2005) even suggest that there may be situations in which 
foreignness can be an advantage rather than a liability. 
 Thus, there is considerable evidence that the theoretical arguments and empirical analyses 
have been mostly confined to the discussion of LOF associated with a product market entry by a 
foreign firm. In the following sections we will extend these arguments to situations when a 
foreign firm offers its securities to investors located overseas either through an IPO or secondary 
offerings. 
LIABILITIES OF FOREIGNNESS IN CAPITAL MARKETS 
AND THEIR ANTECEDENTS 
  
 Because strategic decisions relate to issues of domain selection and domain navigation 
(Bourgeois, 1980) it is not surprising that much of the research in the international business, 
strategic management, and entrepreneurship areas surrounds the product market strategies 
pursued by firms and the liabilities they face when operating abroad. Certainly, the strategies 
firms pursue in the product market domain are one of the most important decisions that a firm 
will make.  However, firms often need external financial resources in order to capitalize on 
growth opportunities provided by their chosen product markets.  The equity capital raised on the 
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stock market is usually cheaper than private money and publicly traded shares are a useful 
currency in making acquisitions and helping a company to grow.  Given the rapid globalization 
of capital markets, it is important to explore whether LOF applies to capital markets.  And if it 
does, it is equally important to identify the sources of LOF in capital markets as well as the 
specific strategies that firms can pursue to reduce such liabilities.   
 There are a variety of reasons why firms choose to seek equity financing outside of the 
home markets.  In addition to the financial benefits, marketing and public relations benefits, 
political benefits, and employee relations benefits have been pointed out (Biddle & Saudagaran, 
1991; Howe & Kelm, 1987; Mittoo, 1992; Saudagaran, 1988). Using data on the capital raising 
activities of foreign firms in the U.S., it has been demonstrated that a successful listing can 
enhance operations or sales in the U.S., enhance analyst coverage, and provide firms with larger 
amounts of capital in order to pursue growth and acquisition strategies (Ritter & Welch, 2002). 
By listing in a foreign market, firms can obtain access to more liquid markets, more easily attract 
debt capital at lower costs and better terms, and tap into a wider investor base (Claessens, & 
Schmukler, 2007).  In addition, there are a number of regulatory and institutional changes that 
have helped foster international capital raising activities.  A number of countries have eased 
restrictions on foreign ownership in recent years.  One of the biggest developments that have 
facilitated the entry of small and medium sized firms into global capital markets is the 
establishment of stock exchanges in several major financial centers requiring lower levels of 
transparency of listed firms.  Although there are considerable advantages to seeking equity from 
host country capital markets, firms also face many liabilities due to their foreign origin.   
 Identifying and measuring CMLOF presents challenges that are specific to capital 
markets. Yet, understanding what forms these liabilities can take and identifying their sources 
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are vital to developing strategies for overcoming them.  Liability of foreignness is inherently a 
relative construct in that its degree can only be assessed relative to host country competitors 
(Mezias, 2002). Therefore, while there is no equivalent of profitability in capital markets, 
whether debt or equity markets, these liabilities may manifest in the form of higher costs of 
raising capital, lower liquidity of its securities, and tighter regulation of foreign firm’s securities 
compared to their domestic counterparts.  Alternatively, firms raising equity in a host country 
capital market may have to “underprice” its shares (e.g., offer its equity at a price that may be 
lower than equilibrium trading price), pay higher underwriting fees, pay higher professional fees 
(ex. costs to secure the services of legal advisors, auditors and independent directors), or higher 
initial listing fees, than domestic firms.  Similarly, differences in analyst coverage may result in 
lower trading volume, and therefore, reduced liquidity.  There is growing evidence that foreign 
firms do indeed experience higher costs in host capital markets compared to domestic firms 
(Ding et al., 2010; Oxera, 2008). Foreign firms may also be subject to more restrictive regulation 
than domestic firms.  For example, the Russian firm Severstal was not allowed to issue shares to 
retail investors during an IPO in Hong Kong although it listed its shares in the local stock 
exchange.    
 Despite the integration of capital markets, and the lowering of formal institutional 
barriers that have historically limited foreign ownership of firms around the world, finance 
researchers have consistently found that investors do not take advantage of the diversification 
benefits of foreign stocks (Ahearne et al., 2004; Cooper & Kaplanis, 1994; French & Poterba, 
1991; Tesar & Werner, 1995). For example, studies have shown that U.S. investors hold about 
91 percent of their stock investments in domestic stocks—despite the fact that U.S. stocks 
represent only 49 percent of the world market portfolio (Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & 
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Williamson, 2003; French & Poterba 1991).  Although economic theory suggests that 
international diversification would reduce portfolio risk, it been repeatedly documented in the 
finance literature that both professional and individual investors hold too small portions of their 
wealth in foreign assets because of their preference for domestic over foreign assets has (Cooper 
& Kaplanis, 1994; French & Poterba, 1991; Lessard, 1973, 1976; Levy & Sarnat, 1970; Solnik, 
1974; Tesar & Werner,1995).  Recent evidence by Chan et al. (2005) shows that the 
phenomenon is pervasive across 48 developed and developing countries worldwide. This is 
particularly intriguing because unlike the trade in goods, transactions in financial markets do not 
incur spatial costs as there are virtually no transportation costs.  The preference shown by 
investors to overweight their portfolios with domestic securities and underweight foreign 
securities is generally referred to as “home bias” (French & Poterba, 1991).  This prevalence of 
home bias in capital markets clearly has implications for firms seeking equity in foreign markets.  
Even if a Chinese or Mexican firm lists its securities in the US or UK capital markets, investors 
in these countries still see these as foreign securities because they are issued by foreign firms and 
may still  continue to underweight them in their portfolios.  This, in turn, can lead to lower 
trading volumes, lower security prices, and hence higher cost of capital. 
 Why would investors, who are assumed to be rational, forego the obvious benefits of 
portfolio diversification and continue to invest most of their funds in home markets?  More 
importantly, how does the pervasive ‘home bias’ phenomenon impact the costs firms incur in 
their international capital raising activities? A number of explanations have been offered for the 
puzzling persistence of such suboptimal behavior by investors and these explanations provide 
valuable insights regarding the liabilities faced by firms in capital markets.   
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 Drawing from the many insights gained from research on home bias in capital markets, 
we identify at least four major sources of CMLOF costs.These are institutional distance, 
information asymmetry, unfamiliarity, and cultural differences (Ahearne et al., 2004; Cai & 
Warnock, 2004; Chan et al., 2005; Daude & Fratzscher, 2007; Tesar & Werner, 1995).  Each of 
these is discussed next.  We summarize these costs on the left side of our model in Figure 1.  
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Institutional Distance 
 Scott (1995: 33) defines institutions as “cognitive, normative, and regulative structures 
and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior.” Institutional distance is 
defined as the degree of separation or extent to which institutions differ between countries (Xu & 
Shenkar, 2002). Substantial institutional differences create difficulties for foreign firms 
attempting to achieve legitimacy in a host country (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Xu et al., 2004).  
Of the three dimensions of institutional environment mentioned above, the regulatory dimension 
is particularly salient in explaining LOF in capital markets.  The regulatory dimension consists of 
the rules and laws that provide support for product and capital market participants  and facilitate 
firms’ efforts to acquire resources. Eden and Miller (2004) describe the regulatory pillar as the 
“may” and “may not” behaviors firms must adhere to. A country’s regulatory dimension can 
provide support for firms, including governmental regulations that structure competition within 
industries (Barnett & Carroll, 1995) and rules and policies that structure transactions within 
capital markets.  Regulative distance describes the differences in the general legal environments 
between home and host countries (Xu et al., 2004) and higher regulative distance between two 
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countries can discourage investors from one country to invest in another.  For example, recent 
research on Chinese governance points to the widespread practice of earnings management 
through related party transactions. Such practices are the norm in the Chinese institutional 
context (Chen & Yuan, 2004), but would be frowned upon elsewhere.  
It is generally understood that when investors perceive that the risks and costs of 
acquiring and holding equities issued by foreign firms are sufficiently higher than they are for 
domestic securities, they will choose to keep their focus on domestic firms. These risks and costs 
arise primarily due to institutional differences between home and host country capital markets.  
For example, protections afforded to minority investors may be less in a foreign country 
compared to the investor’s home country.  As a result, investors would demand compensation in 
terms of higher costs of capital, offer discounts etc. when a foreign company comes from a less 
investor-friendly country. In addition, when a firm comes from an institutionally distant country, 
host country investors may lack understanding of informal institutional settings in the home 
country, such as the level of corruption, the importance of informal networks, etc. Again, these 
factors increase risks and uncertainty associated with a foreign firm’s equity, and, consequently, 
its CMLOF. Taxation on foreign income by either country may present additional problems.  
There may be costs resulting from institutional barriers to trade assets.  Each of these problems 
reduce the expected returns on foreign firms’ assets relative to domestic assets, and hence, 
increase CMLOF for foreign issuers.  
Certainly, institutional differences, transaction costs, taxes, and other legal restrictions 
serve as a barrier to international investment, yet to date there is considerable disagreement over 
the extent to which formal institutional barriers account for the home equity bias (Tesar & 
Werner, 1995). If institutional differences and the resulting transaction costs are indeed the 
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reason for home bias, it logically follows that the deregulation and liberalization of asset markets 
would conceivably diminish such bias. However, recent studies demonstrate that the lowering of 
formal institutional barriers does not eliminate home bias (Ahearne et al., 2004). Indeed, despite 
the reduction in ‘direct’ costs or barriers to international investment activity, studies by French 
and Poterba (1991), Tesar and Werner (1995), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), Lewis (1999), Coen 
(2001), and Glassman and Riddick (2001) demonstrate that  empirical support for a cost-based 
explanation for home bias is generally poor. However, regardless of the disagreements over the 
extent to which formal institutions present transaction costs sufficient to dissuade foreign 
investments, researchers agree that differences in legal frameworks concerning, for example, 
accounting systems, corporate governance, restrictive investment regulations, or investor 
protection persist and can likely explain at least part of the home bias (Chan, et al., 2005; 
Dahlquist et al., 2003; Oehler, Rummer, & Wendt, 2008; Rowland, 1999).  
 Similar logic applies when local investors provide capital to overseas companies. 
Although in theory there is no difference between the characteristics of securities (debt or equity) 
issued by a foreign company in the local capital market and those issued by domestic companies, 
investors’ sentiments towards these financial instruments may be driven by regulatory 
differences and costs associated with the firm’s country of origin. In particular, differences in the 
investor protection regimes may be translated into substantial CMLOF costs for companies 
coming from less “investor-friendly” countries. Hence, we suggest: 
Proposition 1: There is a positive relationship between the 
institutional distance between a home and host country and the 
extent of CMLOF faced by a foreign firm. 
 
Information Costs 
 18
 Finance researchers have recently turned their attention to information asymmetry to 
explain the puzzle of home bias in particular and patterns of transnational portfolio investments 
in general (Aviat & Coeurdacier, 2007; Daude & Fratzscher, 2007; Portes & Rey, 2005; Portes, 
Rey & Oh, 2001). Information asymmetry is present whenever one party in a transaction has 
more or better information than the other.  In the case of capital market investments, it is not 
uncommon to have information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders. Asymmetries exist 
because insiders (managers) are able to continually observe changes in investment productivity 
on an individual asset basis while outsiders are only able to obtain highly aggregate information 
at discrete points of time (Aboody & Lev, 2000). In international financial markets, there is 
greater potential for an unequal distribution of information between national and foreign 
investors.  An important source of such asymmetry is uncertainties regarding the codified rules 
regulating the behavior and activities of company insiders in foreign markets. In addition, 
information such as business practices and conventions, national cultures, and corporate cultures 
are required for investors to meaningfully evaluate foreign financial assets, but such information 
is often difficult to obtain and even more difficult to interpret.   
In sum, local investors have better knowledge than their foreign counterparts about 
domestic firms.  Foreign investors often face high barriers to access information when attempting 
to evaluate their ownership levels in foreign assets. A significant body of empirical studies has 
accumulated in recent years which clearly suggest that information costs do indeed affect the 
composition of investors’ portfolios. For example, it has been found that foreign equity 
portfolios are skewed towards the equities of large firms (Kang & Stulz, 1997), information 
flows are an important determinant of cross-border equity transactions (Portes & Rey, 2005), 
and, even within countries, investors tend to hold stocks of local companies (Coval & 
 19
Moskowitz, 1999). These studies suggest that asymmetric information between local and non-
local investors are an important factor for investment decisions.  The logic of the above 
arguments that investors exhibit a home bias because of the prevalence of information 
asymmetries is equally applicable to decisions to invest in the equities of a foreign firm even if it 
is listed in the domestic stock exchange. Hence: 
Proposition 2: There is a positive relationship between the 
information costs that an investor in the host capital market would 
incur and the extent of CMLOF faced by a foreign firm.  
 
Unfamiliarity Costs 
 Along with information costs, research has shown that firms must also contend with the 
fact that investors do not invest in firms they are not familiar with.  Merton (1987) shows that 
due to the high costs of information gathering and processing, investors only invest in a subset of 
eligible securities that they are familiar with.  A focus on the known or the familiar is sometimes 
referred to as a ‘habitat effect’ (Barberis, Shleifer, & Wurgler, 2005). Extant empirical literature 
provides support for Merton’s argument in international setting, where investments by investors 
in foreign markets are typically allocated to large, less risky, and prominently visible firms 
(Dahlquist & Robertsson, 2001; Kang & Stulz, 1997).  Interestingly, familiarity can often have 
negative effects on returns. For example, Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005) find strong support for 
irrational familiarity by revealing the overweighting of investment portfolios in investors’ home 
markets, and under diversifying the capital that is left for foreign investment across selected few 
“familiar” international markets.  
 Recent research also shows that the familiarity bias or local bias often manifests as a 
preference for geographic proximity (Ivkovich & Weisbenner, 2005). Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999) show that a geographic proximity effect works even within U.S. domestic stock 
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portfolios. These authors demonstrate mutual fund managers prefer to invest in firms 
headquartered close to their home cities. Similarly, investment biases can be regional, rather 
than national in nature.   It has been shown that social identity triggered by group affiliations 
drives under-diversified and domestically biased portfolios (Fellner & Maciejovsky, 2003). 
Lauterbach and Reisman (2004) also support this idea by arguing that investors prefer domestic 
assets to mimic the economic fortunes and welfare of their neighbors, countrymen, and social 
reference group. That emotions related to identity and nationalism may actually trump pure 
rationality in investment decisions is further evidenced by the “patriotism” in portfolio 
allocation decisions of U.S. investors reported by Morse and Shive (2007).  This geographical 
bias suggests that investors will be particularly apprehensive when it comes to buying securities 
issued by foreign firms.  This lack of familiarity can contribute to CMLOF costs. 
 Familiarity matters also at security level investment decisions and the decision to seek 
foreign capital. The important role familiarity plays in investment decisions has been extensively 
studied in recent years.  Kang and Stulz (1997) show that foreign investors in Japan prefer large, 
international manufacturing firms. In a recent study of large number of international funds with 
holdings in 11 developed countries, Covrig, Lau, and Ng (2006) investigated stock selection by 
domestic and foreign fund managers and found that domestic managers typically prefer smaller, 
high market-to-book firms. On the other hand, Cai and Warnock (2004) analyze foreign and 
domestic institutions’ positions in US securities and find that both foreigners and domestic 
investors prefer large, internationally diversified firms. Therefore, foreign companies that do not 
fall under these categories may face additional costs of raising capital on a local capital market, 
hence increasing its CMLOF costs. 
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Familiarity with foreign markets on the part of managers plays a role in their decision on 
whether to seek capital resources abroad or where to seek it.  For example, Sarkissian and Schill 
(2004) find that geographic proximity of the foreign market play a dominant role in selecting 
overseas listing destinations.  In addition, the international experience of top management teams, 
international scope of operations, and industry have all been shown to be factors which prompt 
firms to seek equity resources outside their local capital markets (Bell, Moore, & Al-Shammari, 
2008; Blass & Yafeh, 2001; Hursti & Maula, 2007). While these findings suggest that 
internationalization increases the firm’s visibility and decreases investors’ unfamiliarity costs, 
research evidence clearly support the argument that investors prefer firms they are familiar with 
and that such familiarity often arises from size and proximity.  Clearly, these place foreign firms 
at a distinct disadvantage in host country capital markets. Therefore, we suggest: 
Proposition 3: There is a positive relationship between host market 
investor unfamiliarity with the foreign firm and its home country 
and the extent of CMLOF faced by a foreign firm.  
 
Cultural Differences  
 Culture is often defined as a system of shared values, beliefs, and attitudes that influences 
individual perceptions and behaviors. The role played by culture in economic outcomes is a 
relatively new but growing area of research.  Finance scholars are increasingly recognizing how 
cultural differences among countries influence a wide range of capital market transactions 
(Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2009; Stulz & Williamson, 2003). Indeed, these differences can 
affect the level of trust and nature of financial contracting (Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, 2008).  
In their recent series of papers, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006, 2008, 2009) show that 
perceptions rooted in culture are important and generally omitted determinants of economic 
exchange. For example, they find that level of trust is related to amount of trade, portfolio 
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investment, and direct investment. Trust within a country also affects household and firm level 
investment and lack of trust can affect stock market participation rates.  Given the importance of 
culture in economic exchange, it is only natural that cultural differences between countries will 
have a significant impact on a wide variety of cross-border economic transactions.    
Two developments in the study of national cultures have had a profound impact on using 
cultural difference as an explanatory variable for a variety of organizational phenomena in recent 
years.  First, Hofstede (1980) developed a framework for understanding national cultures 
involving multiple dimensions of culture.  Second, Kogut and Singh (1988) aggregated cultural 
differences across countries along the dimensions identified by Hofstede (1980) and developed a 
composite measure for systematically measuring cultural distance across countries.   Few 
concepts in international business have attracted as much application in diverse areas of research 
as cultural distance (Sousa & Bradley, 2006).  As Shenkar (2001) points out, the cultural distance 
construct has been applied to multiple research questions from innovation and transformation to 
foreign expansion and the ease of transferring technology across borders (Gomez-Mejia & 
Palich, 1997), as well as from affiliate performance to expatriate adjustment (Black & 
Mendenhall, 1991).   While the impact of cultural difference on consumer behavior and 
organizational behavior has received considerable research attention, it is increasingly being 
recognized that it may play an equally important effect on investor behavior.    
In one of the first studies examining the importance of culture and investment behavior, 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) found that investors are more likely to hold, buy, and sell the 
stocks of firms that are located close to the investor, that communicate in the investor’s native 
tongue, and have chief executives of the same cultural background. Subsequent studies have 
supported these findings. Morse and Shive (2007) show that cultures with high levels of 
 23
patriotism have larger proportion of their investments allocated at home. Likewise, Chui, Titman, 
and Wei (2009) propose that cross-cultural differences in terms of individualism versus 
collectivism are related to trading activity levels and security pricing across countries. Chan, 
Covrig and Ng, (2005) find that portfolio allocations of mutual funds depend upon both cultural 
and economic familiarity. When a country is more remote from the rest of the world and has a 
different language, foreign investors are reluctant to invest in that country.  On the other hand, 
when a country is more developed, larger in market capitalization, and has lower transaction 
costs, foreign investors will invest more. Thus, a growing body of empirical evidence is 
accumulating, particularly in finance research, that investor behavior is not entirely rational as 
originally believed and that cultural factors circumscribe investor rationality.  Cultural 
differences can play a significant role in an individual’s decision to invest in the stock of a 
company from a different country and can contribute to LOF costs even in financial markets. 
Proposition 4: There is a positive relationship between the cultural 
differences between the host country and home country and the 
extent of CMLOF faced by a foreign firm.  
 
 
STRATEGIES FOR OVERCOMING LIABILITIES 
OF FOREIGNNESS IN CAPITAL MARKETS 
 
 The existence of liabilities stemming from foreignness makes it an imperative for firms 
accessing international capital markets to engage in strategies designed to overcome these 
liabilities.  While the problems of information asymmetry can be addressed to some extent with 
greater frequency and quality of disclosure and problems arising from unfamiliarity may 
diminish over time, one of the fundamental problems faced by foreign firms in international 
capital markets is what Schmidt and Sofka (2009) referred to as “legitimacy deficit.”  Attaining 
legitimate status is critical to both the short and long term success of firms in host capital 
markets.   In the case of firms attempting to acquire resources in a host country capital market, 
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legitimacy would be the perception that the firm is similar to other host country firms in that 
market, or would act in a manner consistent with shareholder wealth generation, or is endorsed 
by organizations that are known and trusted. Legitimacy is particularly important in new 
ventures as it is critical to the ability to acquire other resources, including capital (Zimmerman & 
Zeitz, 2002). This is because increased legitimacy has been associated with generating increased 
resource flows (Deeds, 2004). Hence, foreign firms have to engage in actions that increase their 
legitimacy in foreign capital markets.  In this paper, we identify how four strategies - bonding, 
signaling, organizational isomorphism, and endorsements by reputable third parties - may 
moderate the relationship between the antecedent factors we discussed above and LOF in host 
capital markets. These strategies can be found at the top of our model in Figure 1.   
Bonding 
 One of the biggest developments that have facilitated the entry of firms into global capital 
markets is the establishment of stock exchanges requiring lower levels of transparency. For 
example, in 1995 the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) was established in the U.K. to cater 
the capital demands of small and medium sized firms. Since then, a number of the world’s 
exchanges have started new trading platforms modeled after London’s AIM market2. Yet, while 
firms have increased access to equity and credit markets around the world through exchanges 
requiring lower levels of governance and transparency, simply listing on these exchanges may do 
little to reduce CMLOF costs. As an alternative, firms can diminish their CMLOF costs by 
taking a more strategic approach by choosing to raise capital in host markets that protect 
                                                          
2 The Borsa Italiana introduced in early 2009 the AIM Italia. In Germany, the Deutsche Borse contains the 
Freiverkehr, which is modeled after London’s AIM with lower listing requirements. Prague, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore have also subdivided their primary markets to compete for small and medium sized firms attempting to 
acquire capital resources. In the US, foreign firms have a growing number of new financial vehicles that can be used 
to raise capital, including Depository Receipts and Rule 144A listings.   
 25
minority investors to a greater extent than their home country’s regulatory regime, and that 
requires greater transparency in corporate governance. 
 Starting with the influential papers by Coffee (1999) and Stulz (1999), the foreign listing 
literature in finance has argued that firms incorporated in countries with poor investor protection 
can credibly bond themselves to better investor protection by offering their shares in host 
markets with higher standards of investor protection. Offering shares on overseas markets as a 
means to improve a firm’s corporate governance systems is often referred to as the ‘bonding 
hypothesis’ (Coffee, 1999; 2002).  Under the bonding hypothesis, opting for a listing in a more 
demanding exchange provides a means for foreign issuers to credibly commit to stricter 
regulation and the protection of investor rights against managerial self-dealing or excess 
consumption of private benefits of control. In other words, offering shares on foreign exchanges 
can serve as a credible bonding mechanism in that the firm will be subject to the increased 
scrutiny of multiple external monitors in the cross listing country. Even more important than the 
decision to list in a foreign market is the choice of the specific exchange.  Different exchanges 
even within a country have different disclosure requirements and therefore in order to “bond” a 
firm will have to list its securities in an exchange that demands very high standards of disclosure 
and governance. 
 Foreign firms that list on US exchanges “bonds” themselves to the US regulatory regime, 
which provides higher investor protection than the firm’s home market. By committing itself to 
stricter regulation the firm can enjoy greater access to capital markets. This occurs because, as 
Coffee (1999) argues, exposure to SEC enforcement and shareholder litigation decreases the 
principal-agency problem. Once foreign issuers list in capital markets that have stricter 
governance regulations than their own home market, the relative importance of variations 
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between the corporate laws and corporate governance of different countries should decline in the 
minds of potential investors.  Studies have shown that firms originating in countries with low 
investor protection levels can achieve a range of benefits by listing in markets that uphold 
minority shareholder rights. For example, listing in a host country with better investor protection 
is associated with lower cost of capital (Hail & Leuz, 2009), more scrutiny by financial analysts 
(Lang et al., 2003), better access to external finance (Reese & Weisbach, 2002) and higher firm 
valuation (Doidge, 2004). Thus, in addition to seeking larger market capitalization, greater 
liquidity, higher valuations, performance and foreign sales, legal bonding is part of the 
international capital raising decision for a growing percentage of foreign firms (Claessen et al., 
2003).  
 In previous sections we considered four antecedent factors of the CMLOF: institutional 
distance, information costs, unfamiliarity costs and cultural differences. Here we argue that their 
effects on the firm’s CMLOF may be reduced by bonding. Hence: 
Proposition 5: Bonding on the part of the foreign firm negatively 
moderates the relationship between antecedent factors and the 
extent of CMLOF faced by a foreign firm.  
 
Signaling  
 Bonding hypothesis suggests that the firm may reduce its CMLOF by choosing a highly 
regulated host market. However, even in less regulated markets it can mitigate negative effects of 
CMLOF by signaling its quality to investors. The importance of signals in capital markets has 
long been recognized, especially in research on the pricing of IPOs.  Signaling theory refers to 
methods investors use in situations of information asymmetry where insiders (e.g., owners) of an 
IPO hold more information than outsiders (Spence, 1973). Researchers have focused upon 
uncovering a range of signals associated with the IPO firm that managers employ to convey its 
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value to potential investors (Certo et al., 2001; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; Sanders & Boivie, 
2004; Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004).  IPOs are characterized by information asymmetry in which 
owners have more complete information than investors regarding the quality of the firm (Beatty, 
1989; Carter & Manaster, 1990).  We believe that many of the signals identified in IPO literature 
may be equally efficacious in reducing CMLOF. 
To combat the investors’ lack of information about an IPO, a number of organizational 
attributes can serve as indicators of the strength of an organization at IPO (Beatty, 1989; Carter 
& Manaster, 1990).   The various such signals identified in IPO research include insider 
ownership (Leland & Pyle, 1977), CEO equity ownership (Certo, Daily, Cannella, & Dalton, 
2003), equity ownership by outside directors (Sanders & Boivie, 2004), blockholder and 
institutional ownership (Sanders & Boivie, 2004), founder as CEO (Certo, Covin, Daily, & 
Dalton, 2001; Nelson, 2003; Fischer & Pollock, 2004), size (Ibbotson, Sindelar, & Ritter,1988) 
and age (Ritter, 1991).  Other important signals identified in prior research include dividends 
(Bhattacharrya, 1979), revealed risk (Beatty & Zajac, 1994), and the specific ways in which the 
proceeds of the issue would be used (Beatty & Ritter, 1986). Given that cross-listings and IPOs 
are the two primary means by which firms access foreign equity markets, a number of the above 
signals would prove to be useful in reducing the level of CMLOF experienced by a firm. 
A McKinsey survey of more than 200 institutional investors who hold accounts 
worldwide revealed that their decision to invest is largely determined by the governance of a 
firm (Coombes & Watson, 2000). Hence it not surprising that, apart from a range of firm-level 
demographic characteristics such as age, size, industry affiliation, etc., corporate governance 
characteristics, such as retained share ownership (Loughran & Ritter, 2004), and board 
characteristics (Arthurs et al., 2008), have come to be regarded as important signals of 
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governance quality.  The presence of outside directors is increasingly recognized as leading to 
good governance and hence can serve as a signal of good governance.  In the US, research has 
found that independent directors impact a range of board decisions, including the removal of 
non-performing CEOs (Weisbach, 1988) and resist greenmail payments (Kosnik, 1987).  Boards 
with higher proportions of outside directors have lower incidences of financial statement fraud 
(Beasly, 1996) while boards dominated by management are more likely to incur accounting 
enforcement actions by the SEC (Dechow et al., 1996). Evidence from the UK has shown that 
firms with a majority of outside directors exhibit greater reporting conservatism (Beekes et al., 
2004).  In addition, numerous studies in the field of accounting demonstrate that firms with 
independent directors engage in less earnings management (Bedard, Chtourou, & Courteau, 
2004; Peasnell et al., 2000).  Given the strength of empirical evidence suggesting the relationship 
between presence of independent directors and good governance, appropriate board composition 
can be a powerful signal to potential investors, especially for firms attempting to enter an 
overseas capital market. By signaling its value through “good corporate governance”, the firm 
may differentiate itself from other firms from the same country (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002), 
and, therefore, reduce costs associated with CMLOF. Therefore, we suggest: 
Proposition 6: Signals of good governance on the part of the 
foreign firm negatively moderates the relationship between 
antecedent factors and the extent of CMLOF faced by a foreign 
firm.  
 
Organizational Isomorphism 
 Isomorphism in organizational fields is a central concept of institutional theory 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).   Organizations seek to attain legitimacy 
through mimetic processes that result in their becoming similar to other organizations in an 
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organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Generally speaking, legitimacy may be 
considered ‘a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate  within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions’ (Suchman,1995: 571). Firms considered legitimate by market stakeholders tend to 
succeed more frequently in competitive capital markets (Deeds, 2004).  In fact, legitimacy is 
considered even more important for emerging firms entering a market because the organization’s 
chances of survival are significantly enhanced (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Baum & Oliver, 1992; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Rao, 1994).  Similarly, LOF studies have also emphasized the 
importance of strategic conformity relative to local firms to the performance of foreign 
subsidiaries (Miller & Eden, 2006).  
 There is evidence that firms from certain industries, or from certain countries, may have 
more success in some capital markets over others. For example, knowledge-intensive foreign 
firms may be able to overcome CMLOFs on U.S. exchanges not merely because of enhanced 
intellectual property protection, but also due to the manner in which the formal regulative 
institutional environment of the U.S. supports and promotes inventive and entrepreneurial 
activities.  A recent edition of the World Competitiveness Yearbook shows that the U.S. 
regulatory environment offered higher intellectual property protection levels than its closest 
rival, U.K. Also, the first-to-invent patent issuing process of the U.S. (Cohen et al., 2002) also 
provides considerable protection to firms that are knowledge intensive. Further, as Hursti and 
Maula (2007) argue, technology firms tend to prefer large markets or markets where a large 
number of similar companies are already listed because of the low costs of information transfer. 
These authors conclude that “seeking an investor base that ‘understands’ the business of the IPO 
candidate is often cited as the reason for listing overseas” (Hursti & Maula, 2007; 838).  These 
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findings are supported by the evidence of foreign listings of Israeli and Dutch IPOs provided by 
Blass and Yafeh (2001), as well as cross-listings of R&D intensive firms by Pagano et al. (2002).  
 Foreign companies from specific industries can overcome information and knowledge 
gaps by opting for markets where investors and analysts have an understanding and proven 
expertise in these industries. Particularly in technology or higher-risk sectors, the availability of 
such skills may substantially affect the availability of equity finance and the terms at which it is 
available. Better analyst coverage of such industries is likely to broaden understanding in the 
primary market, promote investor interest, and ultimately deliver higher valuations of the 
companies. If industry expertise is an important determinant of where to list and raise capital, 
one would expect to observe companies in the same industry clustered in exchanges that deliver 
this expertise. Previous studies have indeed found that companies opt for listings where industry 
peers are already present (Pagano et al., 2002). While the NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges 
provide trading platforms for the largest number of leading high-technology companies whose 
shares enjoy worldwide visibility and liquidity, Toronto’s TSX and London’s AIM exchanges 
have the most sophisticated and mature mining finance markets in the world, whereas the Hong 
Kong stock exchange is the destination market of choice for Chinese state-controlled companies 
seeking capital (Cetorelli & Peristiani, 2009).  As these examples demonstrate, it is not 
uncommon for firms to seek capital markets where similar firms are already established and 
understood by resource holders. Hence, it is through a careful examination of their social identity 
that firms can potentially achieve legitimate status with influential capital market actors. As a 
result, this enhanced legitimization may lead to a reduction of its CMLOF. 
Proposition 7: Organizational isomorphism on the part of the foreign firm 
negatively moderates the relationship between antecedent factors and the 
extent of CMLOF faced by a foreign firm. 
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Endorsements 
 As Rao (1994: 31) notes “the very act of endorsement embeds an organization in a status 
hierarchy and thereby builds the reputation of an organization”.  The value of third party 
endorsements (e.g., prestigious underwriters, audit firms, and alliance partners) in reducing the 
degree of uncertainty surrounding security issues is built upon the social status of the certifying 
organization. Therefore, a relationship with a high-status partner can be considered a powerful 
endorsement for the unfamiliar firm and thus act as a reputational source of legitimacy (Baum & 
Oliver, 1991; Podolny, 1994).   
 A wide assortment of organizational and extra-organizational attributes that serve as 
important cues regarding the quality of an unfamiliar firm to capital market resource providers 
have been investigated in prior research (Ritter, 1991; Ritter & Welch, 2002). Coffee (1999, 
2002) and Stulz (1999), emphasize the role of “reputational intermediaries” in U.S. markets.  
These intermediaries include underwriters (in the case of capital-raising listings), auditors, debt-
rating agencies, securities analysts as well as the exchanges themselves (via listing requirements) 
(Carter, Dark & Singh, 1998; Carter & Manaster, 1990; Loughran & Ritter, 2004).  They provide 
additional scrutiny or monitoring that is unavailable in the home markets of foreign firms. These 
local investors are attractive to foreign investors, because they reduce information asymmetry, 
add value, and provide legitimacy.  They have information about the operation of the local 
market, including access to deal flow as well as dense networks of contacts and also have 
considerable familiarity with the legal requirements of the local market.     
 This analysis suggests that foreign firms can reduce their CMLOF by using means 
external to an organization, such as endorsing and certifying by third party agents (banks-
underwriters; audit firms, private equity investors, etc). However, the extent of this endorsement 
 32
effect is contingent on the institutional infrastructure of local capital markets. In some markets, 
such as the U.S. stock markets, formal arrangements with bank-underwriters and other third 
parties who act as “gate keepers” may be particularly salient means of reducing CMLOF among 
foreign firms attempting to issue local securities. In the U.K., however, foreign firms rely on 
more informal relations with their gatekeepers using networks and reputation considerations as 
means to reduce CMLOF. 
Proposition 8: Endorsements of the foreign firm by reputable third parties 
negatively moderates the relationship between antecedent factors and the 
extent of CMLOF faced by a foreign firm.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 Liability of foreignness has been one of the most researched topics in international 
business since the beginning of the field in the early 1960s.  LOF is central to the development of 
theories of the multinational firm, but most such theories accorded LOF what amounts to a 
“taken for granted” status.  Starting with the pioneering work of Zaheer (1995), the last fifteen 
years have seen a sudden proliferation of empirical and theoretical work on LOF and many 
stimulating intellectual debates on the domain of the construct, its measurement, and strategies 
for overcoming it.  It was natural that much of this work focused on LOF in product markets 
because much of the early internationalization efforts of firms in developed and emerging 
markets occurred primarily in product markets.  While the strategies firms pursue in the product 
market domain can make the difference between success and failure, firms often need external 
financial resources in order to take advantage of the growth opportunities provided by their 
chosen product markets. Our study draws attention to the growing number of firms that choose to 
seek capital resources outside of their home capital markets and develops a framework to 
understand both the sources of CMLOF and strategies that firms can use to mitigate those costs. 
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 Our study draws from the pervasiveness of the ‘home bias’ phenomena among investors 
around the world to explain how firms incur additional costs when raising funds outside of their 
home capital markets. As firms rush to cross-list their stock in multiple markets and choose to 
make their capital market debut in foreign markets through IPOs, it becomes important to 
examine the existence of LOF in capital markets. We identify four major types of costs that 
result in LOF in capital markets.  These are institutional distance, information costs, 
unfamiliarity costs, and costs arising from cultural differences (Ahearne et al., 2004; Cai & 
Warnock, 2004; Chan et al., 2005; Daude & Fratzscher, 2007; Tesar & Werner, 1995).  Each of 
these places the foreign firm at a disadvantage compared to domestic firms in host capital 
markets. 
   Drawing from institutional and signaling theories we identified four specific strategies 
that firms can use to overcome CMLOF. These are bonding, signaling, organizational 
isomorphism, and endorsements by third parties. Together these strategies enhance the 
legitimacy of the foreign firm and level the playing field with respect to domestic firms vying for 
capital resources.    
 Expanding the scope of LOF research to include the costs facing firms acquiring 
resources in host capital markets presents a number of additional research opportunities. Most 
important among them is the impact of the institutional environment of a country on the 
likelihood of success of specific strategies to overcome CMLOF. The recent accumulation of 
research examining the differences between the institutional environments of emerging and 
developed economies suggests that success of specific strategies firms employ to mitigate 
CMLOF costs may be a function of the institutional characteristics of the host country. For 
example, certain governance signals, such as stock-based executive compensation is so prevalent 
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in the U.S. that it has achieved a “taken for granted status” (Sanders & Boivie, 2004: 171) 
whereas this form of governance signal may be less accepted in other host capital markets. 
Likewise, large investment banks are relevant social actors in the US capital market, and could 
conceivably confer legitimacy to foreign firms seeking capital on US exchanges. On the other 
hand, investors contemplating investments in emerging market firms listing on London’s AIM 
exchange rely on the standing of Nominated Advisors (nomads) as a proxy for the quality of 
listed companies (Davidoff, 2007).  Nomads, which are normally lower and medium-tier 
investment banks, serve as gatekeepers, advisers, and regulators of AIM-listed companies 
(Aaronson, 2007).  As these examples suggest, it is important to recognize that the ability of 
governance signals and endorsement to reduce LOF costs may be contingent on both home and 
host institutional environments.   
 Along with this line of inquiry, authors have questioned whether governance signals will 
always convey substantive information to resource holders (Westphal & Zajac, 1994; Westphal 
& Zajac, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1995).  It is quite possible that certain governance and 
endorsement signals may convey substantive information to investors in one institutional 
environment, yet be understood as merely symbolic, and perhaps discounted, in others. 
Investigations into the value of symbolic and substantive signals can help in understanding how 
the prevailing institutional logics (Zajac & Westphal, 2004) of capital markets are formed, how 
they change, and how differences in institutional logics across capital markets present differing 
costs and benefits to firms looking to acquire capital outside of their home market.   
 Much of our discussion in this paper was restricted to CMLOF in formal equity markets 
because firms have traditionally gained access to capital via public capital markets. However, 
private equity firms represent an innovation in the ability to provide capital to unquoted firms 
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(Wright et al., 2009). Hence, future research could explore the occurrence of CMLOF within 
informal capital markets. For example, foreign private equity firms entering overseas markets 
may face higher transactions costs in both identifying and monitoring firms to invest in. By 
virtue of their foreignness they also likely experience greater information asymmetries. In 
addition, studies have shown that CMLOF can have significant impacts on cross-border venture 
capital activity. Indeed, cultural differences and geographical distance can create problems in 
cross-border VC investments (Meyer & Shao, 1995) and can diminish the commitment of 
venture capitalists in foreign markets (Maula & Mäkelä, 2003). Bruton et al. (2010) also indicate 
that the extent and nature of agency conflicts associated with equity issuance may be different in 
different institutional environments. As a result, national institutions can moderate the 
effectiveness of signals and bonding strategies deployed by foreign firms to mitigate their 
CMLOF. Future analysis can usefully integrate institutional theory and economic sociology 
research to develop a more holistic view on the antecedent factors and moderators of LOF in 
different institutional contexts. 
 Finally, another promising avenue for future would be examining whether overcoming 
CMLOF in equity markets would lead to spillover benefits in other capital raising activities (for 
example, in credit markets), or even in product market activities.  Such an examination would 
result in a better integration of LOF research in capital and product markets. Also, it would be 
interesting to examine how the benefits of being foreign in certain cases may overcome the costs 
associated with being foreign.  
 In this paper we argued for the expansion of the domain of the liabilities of foreignness 
construct to include liabilities faced in capital markets. The increasingly integrated global capital 
markets have greatly impacted the opportunities available to firms worldwide seeking to lower 
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their costs of capital. However, a significant body of literature has demonstrated a pervasive bias 
among investors against firms founded in dissimilar cultural and institutional environments. 
Indeed, overcoming investor bias represents real costs to the firm and is a steep challenge to the 
manager looking to acquire capital resources abroad. In this paper we identify a number of 
causes for investor bias and the resulting CMLOF and suggest a range of strategic responses that 
firms can employ to overcome them.  
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TABLE 1 
Empirical Evidence of the Existence of Liabilities of Foreignness in Product Markets 
 
 
Article Study Focus Operationalization of LOF Sample Findings
Li & Guisinger (1991) 
Do foreign-controlled firms in the 
US fail more frequently than 
domestically owned firms?
Differences in bankruptcies and 
liquidations between foreign 
controlled firms in the US and the 
Dun and Bradstree annual business 
failure rates.
Comparison of the number 
of foreign-controlled 
bankruptcies and 
liquidations per 10,000 of 
foreign controlled firms in 
the U.S. against the Dun & 
Bradstreet annual business 
failure rate index of U.S. 
firms. 
Foreign-controlled firms fail less than 
domestically controlled firms.
Shukla & Van Inwegen 
(1995)
Do UK mutual funds investing in 
the US perform better than US
mutual funds investing in the US?
Comparison of the gross returns of 
US and UK and mutual funds.
108 US mutual funds and 
19 UK mutual funds
Information and relationship advantages enable
US mutual funds investing in the US to 
perform better than UK mutual funds 
investing in the US.
Zaheer (1995) 
Is there a performance difference 
between foreign and local FX 
trading rooms? 
"the difference between the average 
profits per trader of all local trading 
rooms and the foreign room's profits 
per trader in the same city" (p.350)
28 trading rooms located in 
New York and Tokyo
Trading rooms of foreign banks in a given
location are less profitable than those of local 
banks. 
DeYoung & Nolle (1996) 
Are foreign-owned U.S. banks less 
profitable than U.S.-owned banks 
between 1985 and 1990.
Profit efficiency differences between 
foreign owned banks in the US and 
domestic banks. 
62 foreign-owned U.S. 
banks, and 240 U.S.-owned 
banks. 
Foreign-owned U.S. banks are less profit 
efficient than U.S.-owned banks between 1985 
and 1990.
Hasan & Hunter (1996) 
Are foreign-owned multinational 
banks operating in the US less 
efficient than US owned 
multinational banks?
Efficiency scores of foreign owned 
and US owned banks using a 
stochastic frontier approach.
70 Japanese-owned 
multinational banks, 984 
US-owned multinational
banks 
Japanese-owned multinational banks operating 
in the US are less efficient than US owned 
multinational banks
Zaheer & Mosakowski 
(1997)
Is there a survival rate difference
between foreign and local FX 
trading rooms? 
Survival functions (probability that 
an event occurs after a certain 
duration, given initial starting 
conditions). 
2667 trading rooms located 
in 47 countries
The survival rate of foreign- owned trading
rooms was significantly lower than that of 
local trading rooms.
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TABLE 1 
Empirical Evidence of the Existence of Liabilities of Foreignness in Product Markets (cont.) 
 
 
Article Study Focus Operationalization of LOF Sample Findings
Thompsen (2000)
Do foreign owned manufacturing 
subsidiaries have greater chances
of survival than domestic owned 
firms in Denmark,?
Survival functions of domestic firms 
compared to the subsidiaries of 
foreign firms.
378 domestic subsidiaries 
and 239 foreign subsidiaries
Foreign owned manufacturing subsidiaries 
have lower survival probability than domestic 
owned firms.
Hennart, Roehl, & Zeng 
(2002) 
Are all foreign firm exits from a 
country due to LOF?
Exits due to difficulties in human 
resource management,  overoptimistic 
market forecasts,  and difficulties 
dealing with the local government. 
32 Japanese manufacturing 
affiliates who exited from 
the US 
Exits proxy for LOF costs only in a small 
number of cases (13 out of 32 in this study)
Mata & Portugal (2002)
Do foreign and domestic firms 
experience different chances of 
survival?
Survival functions of domestic and 
foreign greenfield ventures
613 foreign owned and  593 
domestic firms
No differences in gross exit rates between 
foreign and domestic greenfield ventures
Mezias, SMJ (2002) 
Are there differences in the
number of labor lawsuits faced by
foreign and domestic firms? 
The number of labor lawsuits 
judgements against firms
486 British, German and 
Japanese subsidiaries 
operating in the U.S. 
matched against 486 US 
firms.
foreign firms face more US labor lawsuits 
judgments than US-owned firms
Miller & Parkhe (2002) 
Is the level of X-efficiency of 
foreign-owned banks lower than 
that of host country banks?
The X-efficiency of host country 
banks vs. foreign-owned banks
872 host country banks and 
428 foreign-owned banks 
that operate in 13 host
countries. 
Foreign-owned banks exhibit lower X-
efficiency than host country banks.
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TABLE 1 
Empirical Evidence of the Existence of Liabilities of Foreignness in Product Markets (cont.) 
 
Article Study Focus Operationalization of LOF Sample Findings
Miller & Richards 
(2002) 
Examines the performance of host 
country and foreign-owned firms 
in the European Union to
investigate the moderating effect 
of host country characteristics on 
the degree of liability of 
foreignness
The X-efficiency of host country 
banks vs. foreign-owned banks
700 host country and 257 
foreign banks in the 
European Union
Host country firms are more X-efficient than 
foreign firms in highly competitive host 
countries. There are no X-efficiency 
differences in less competitive host countries.
Nachum (2003) 
Are there performance differences
between foreign and domestic
firms in the financial services 
industry in the City of London?
The return on capital (ROC) of 
foreign firms compared to the average 
ROC performance of British-owned 
firms. 
296 foreign owned financial 
services firms in the City of 
London.
Foreign financial firms have higher rates of 
return on capital than British-owned firms.
Sofka & Zimmerman 
(2008) 
Investigates whether the amount
of economic stress in a host 
country region influences the 
impact of liability of foreignness.
Investigates whether foreign 
producers experience LOF in the 
German car market and if so is there a 
difference in the magnitude of LOF 
across regions within the same 
country.
439 German and 759 
foreign car models from 23 
domestic and foreign car 
manufacturers.
Foreign firms face significant LOF in the 
German car market.  However, they experience 
lower levels of LOF in regions experiencing
greater economic stress.
Kronborg &Thomsen 
(2009) 
Investigates how foreign
ownership  affects the survival of 
companies
Survival functions of domestic firms 
compared to the subsidiaries of 
foreign firms.
528 pairs of foreign-owned 
and domestic-owned 
manufacturing companies in 
Denmark over a 110 year 
period
Domestic companies have higher exit risk than 
foreign subsidiaries. 
Schmidt & Sofka (2009)
Is there a difference between 
foreign subsidiaries and domestic
firms in terms of host country 
knowledge spillovers?
Differences between foreign and 
domestic firms in (a) and knowledge 
spillovers from customers and (b) 
knowledge spillovers from 
universities based upon survey 
responses.
1129 companies located in 
Germany; 1020 domestic 
firms, 109 foreign MNC 
subsidiaries
Foreign MNC subsidiaries are significantly 
less likely to receive valuable knowledge from 
German customers and/or scientific sources 
than domestic firms. 
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FIGURE 1 
Capital Market Liabilities of Foreignness:  
Antecedent Factors and Mitigation Strategies  
 
 
 
